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Inequitable Conduct and Supplemental Examination
ABSTRACT
The America Invents Act, signed into law on September 16, 2011,
ushered in an array of patent reforms. One overlooked procedure,
Supplemental Examination, seeks to purge putative instances of
inequitable conduct prior to litigation by allowing patent owners to
submit prior art and short statements to the USPTO after patent
issuance. Few parties have used it. We analyze the law of inequitable
conduct, explain the Supplemental Examination procedure, and discuss
potential reasons for its lack of popularity among patent owners.
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The defense of inequitable conduct, one of the most powerful
litigation tools available to an accused infringer, ensures against the
fraudulent procurement of patents. Every person associated with the
filing and prosecution of a U.S. patent application owes to the USPTO
a duty of candor and good faith. If an accused infringer has evidence
to suggest that the patent owner breached his duty, he may raise a
defense of inequitable conduct. When found, inequitable conduct
renders the patent unenforceable against all past, present, and future
infringers, even potentially affecting the enforceability of related
patents. The Damocles' sword of unenforceability due to inequitable
conduct drastically complicates patent valuation and investment in
cutting-edge technology.
The AIA offers patent owners an opportunity to reduce
uncertainty through a new procedure called supplemental
examination.4 This new procedure allows any patent owner to request
that the USPTO consider, reconsider, or correct information in the
patent or its file history. Within three months, the Director will
determine whether information in the request raises a substantial new
question of patentability. If so, he will order exparte reexamination in
view of the submitted evidence, during which the patent owner can
argue for patentability of the claimed invention. Importantly, anything
considered in the request for supplemental examination or the ensuing
ex parte reexamination is, by statute, barred as the basis for a later
finding of inequitable conduct.
Still, there are important limitations to what supplemental
examination can accomplish. First, supplemental examination becomes
unavailable once inequitable conduct has been raised in either a
paragraph IV notice letter or a pending litigation. The cleansing
effect of supplemental examination occurs only once the proceeding
and any ex parte reexamination ordered therefrom has drawn to a
close. So, if the patent becomes involved in litigation before the
USPTO completes its review, the accused infringer may raise an
inequitable conduct defense regarding any information that the patent
owner asked the USPTO to consider in its request for supplemental
4 35 U.S.C. § 257; See Janet Gongola, Tips for Filing a Complaint Supplemental
Examination Request USPTO (Dec. 19, 2012, 5:18 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/aia/entry/fromjanetgongola-patent-reform.
5 The term "paragraph IV notice letter" refers to a notice received by a patent
owner under section 505(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2013)), notifying the patent owner that a generic
pharmaceutical company has filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA")
requesting FDA approval to market a generic version of a patent-protected drug.
6 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A).
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examination.!
This Article analyzes inequitable conduct and the availability of
AIA supplemental examination. Part I provides a brief history of
inequitable conduct; Part II discusses the legal standards for
inequitable conduct in district court and at the Federal Circuit; Part III
discusses strategies for navigating the district court; and Part IV
discusses recent developments via Supplemental Examination. Part V
briefly concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense invoked by a party
accused of patent infringement. It is brought when there is evidence to
suggest that the patent owner breached his duty of good faith and
candor to the USPTO.8 To successfully prove inequitable conduct, an
accused infringer must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
patent owner misrepresented, withheld, or falsified material
information during prosecution of the patent and that the patent owner
intended to deceive the USPTO through such conduct.9
Courts apply a two-part test to analyze allegations of inequitable
conduct. A court first determines whether the information
misrepresented, withheld, or falsified meets threshold levels of
materiality, and whether there was intent to deceive. If the court
determines the evidence meets the threshold levels for materiality and
intent, the court then weighs the evidence-in light of all the
circumstances-to determine whether the patent owner's conduct was
so culpable as to require that the patent be declared unenforceable. 0
A ruling finding inequitable conduct renders a patent
unenforceable against all past, present, and future infringers, and may
also affect the enforceability of related applications." In view of these
powerful, far-reaching effects, unsurprisingly parties raised inequitable
conduct as a defense in approximately 80% of all patent litigations. 12
' 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(B).
8 See Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
9 See id. at 1287.
"1 Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
12 Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 7, 8 (2008); however the accuracy of this statistic has been called into
question, see, e.g., Benjamin Brown, Inequitable Conduct. A Standard in Motion, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 626 (stating that the inequitable
conduct defense is "pled in a mere 20% of patent infringement cases").
2014] 95
96 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. X
A. The Ongins of the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct
Ex turpi causa non oritur actio-He who comes in equity
must come with clean hands.13
The inequitable conduct defense is a product of both common and
legislative law. The common-law origins of inequitable conduct grew
out of three cases in which the Supreme Court refused to enforce
patents tainted with fraud.14 Beginning in 1933 with Keystone Driller
Co. v. General Excavator Co., the Court found the patent owner had
suppressed evidence of a potentially invalidating prior use of the
claimed invention to prevail in a patent infringement suit.' 5 Invoking
the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," which denies a party relief
if he has acted fraudulently or in bad faith,16 the Court held that the
plaintiff's actions were so unconscionable that they estopped any relief
for the alleged infringement.' 7
In 1944, the Court revisited the issue. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., the patent owner had fabricated a printed
publication from an ostensibly disinterested expert who described the
invention as "a remarkable advance in the art" in order to overcome
"apparently insurmountable Patent Office opposition."' 8 Invoking the
equitable principles discussed in Keystone, the Hazel-Atlas Court held:
"The total effect of all this fraud, practiced both on the Patent Office
and the courts, calls for nothing less than a complete denial of
relief.. . for the claimed infringement of the patent thereby procured
and enforced."19
The triad of Supreme Court cases culminated with Precision
Instrument Manufactuing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery
Co., which the patent owner had asserted a patent after learning that
someone else invented the claimed invention. 20 Relying on Keystone
and Hazel-Atlas's equitable principles,2 1 the Precision Court affirmed
the district court's finding of inequitable conduct, holding that the
13 I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 3 ed., § 339. See Roscoe Pound, The Maxims
ofEquity, 34 HARV. L. REV. 809, 827-36.
14 See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); and Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
15 Keystone, 290 U.S. at 243-46.
16 See John Norton Pomeroy & Spencer W. Symons, A Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence §§ 397-98 (Spencer W. Symons ed. 1941).
17 Keystone, 290 U.S. at 247.
18 Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 240.
19 Id. at 250.
20 Precision, 324 U.S. at 808-14.
21 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 814-15 (citing Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245 and Hazel-
Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246).
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patent owner's hands were so soiled that all of the relief they requested
should be denied.2 2 The Court stated a rule that patent applicants
"have an uncompromising duty to report to [the USPTO] all facts
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the
applications in issue,"2 3 and announced that inequitable conduct exists
whenever a patent owner knew or reasonably should have known that
this duty to the USPTO had been breached.24
Complementing this common-law foundation, inequitable
conduct also has legislative origins. Every patent statute passed by
Congress has contained a provision creating a form of private remedy
against the procurement of patents by fraud. The Patent Acts of 1790
and 1793 authorized private actions to repeal a patent procured by
fraud, stating that "upon oath or affirmation ... that any patent which
shall be issued in pursuance of this act, was obtained surreptitiously by,
or upon false suggestion,... it shall and may be lawful to . . . repeal
such patents." 25 Similarly, the Patent Acts of 1836 and 1870 codified an
affirmative defense to infringement if the applicant obtained the patent
intending to deceive the public. 2 6 Finally, like the Patent Act of 1952,
the current America Invents Act ("AIA") gives an accused infringer an
equitable defense of patent "unenforceability" 27 based on the patent
22 Id. at 819.
23 Id at 818.
24 See id. at 817-19 ("Automotive had every reason to believe and did believe that
Larson's application was fraudulent and his statements perjured .... But where, as
here, the settlement is grounded upon knowledge or reasonable belief of perjury which
is not revealed to the Patent Office or to any other public representative, the settlement
lacks that equitable nature which entitles it to be enforced and protected in a court of
equity.").
25 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 111 (1790); see also Patent Act of 1793, Ch.
11, § 10, 1 Stat. 323.
26 See Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 123 (1836) ("the defendant . .. shall
be permitted to plead . . . that the description and specification filed by plaintiff does
not contain the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or that it contains
more than is necessary to produce the described effect; which concealment or addition
shall fully appear to have been made for the purpose of deceiving the public . .. in
either of which cases judgment shall be rendered for the defendant, with costs."); see
also Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 208 ("in any action for infringement the
defendant may plead ... any one or more of the following special matters: - First. That
for the purpose of deceiving the public the description and specification filed by the
patentee in the patent office was made to contain less than the whole truth relative to
his invention or discovery, or more than is necessary to produce the desired
effect ... and if any one or more of the special matters alleged shall be found for the
defendant, judgment shall be rendered for him with costs.").
27 See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1952) ("The following shall be defenses
in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded:
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability. . . .");
America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. 2011) ("The following shall be
defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be
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owner's unclean hands.28
The defense of inequitable conduct finds further administrative
support in Rules of Practice in Patent Office Cases promulgated by the
USPTO following the Supreme Court's decision in Precision.
Specifically, Rule 56 prohibits fraud on the USPTO and imposes a duty
of candor and good faith on every individual associated with the filing
and prosecution of a patent application.29
The doctrine of inequitable conduct can trace its origins to the
equitable fraud-based defenses codified in each of the Patent Acts, and
recognized by the Supreme Court in Keystone, Hazel-Atlas, and
Precision, and by the USPTO in its administrative regulations. But
beyond the "knew or should have known" test established in Precision,
none provides guidance for determining when inequitable conduct
would be deemed to have occurred.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT
A. The Materiality Standard
Since Precision, the law of inequitable conduct has continually
evolved, as courts fashioned different tests to determine when a patent
should be declared unenforceable. When the Federal Circuit was
created in 1982, there were four separate tests for materiality: (1) the
"objective but for test," under which information was material only if it
would have precluded the patent from issuing; (2) the "subjective but
for test," under which information was material only if it caused the
examiner to issue the patent when he would not otherwise have done
so; (3) the "but it may have test," under which information was material
only if it might have reasonably affected the examiner's determination
of patentability; and (4) the "reasonable examiner test" recited in the
1977 revision to the USPTO's Rule 56, under which information is
material "where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the
pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or
unenforceability.")
28 See, e.g, Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("The defenses which may be raised in an action involving the validity or
infringement of a patent are specified in general terms, by the second paragraph of
section 282, in five numbered items. Item 1 specifies 'Noninfringement, absence of
liability for infringement, or unenforceability' (the last word was added by amendment
in the Senate for greater clarity); this would include ... equitable defenses such as
laches, estoppel and unclean hands.") (citing Commentary on the NewPatentAct, 75
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 215 (1993)).
29 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1951).
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application to issue as a patent."3 o
In 1984, the Federal Circuit decided American Hoist & Derick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., which the defendant accused the patent owner
of inequitable conduct for failing to disclose a piece of prior art during
a reissue proceeding involving the patent at issue. 31 The Federal Circuit
vacated the district court's holding of inequitable conduct and
remanded with the instructions that the court may apply any of the four
tests for materiality in existence stating that "[t]here is no reason ... to
be bound by any single standard, for the answer to any inquiry of fraud
in the PTO does not begin and end with materiality, nor can materiality
be said to be unconnected to other considerations... ."32 Yet the court
stated that the USPTO's reasonable examiner standard, which is
"strikingly similar to the 'but it may have' guideline," 13 is "an
appropriate starting point for any discussion of materiality, for it
appears to be the broadest, thus encompassing the others, and because
that materiality boundary most closely aligns with how one ought to
conduct business with the PTO."34 But the court cautioned that if the
information misrepresented, withheld, or falsified satisfies the
reasonable examiner test but satisfies none of the more stringent "but
for" tests, the low showing of materiality should be offset by using a
higher standard for intent before a patent is declared unenforceable for
inequitable conduct.35
Shortly thereafter, despite having held in American Hoist that any
of the four tests of materiality could be used in an inequitable conduct
analysis, separate Federal Circuit panels rejected both the "objective
but for" and "subjective but for" tests adopting the "reasonable
examiner test" as the only standard for materiality. 36 Specifically, in
1986 the court decided A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., in which the
defendant accused the patent owner of inequitable conduct for having
withheld several prior art references, which the examiner
30 See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2006); and 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
31 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
32 Id. at 1363.
3 Id. at 1362.
34 Id at 1363.
3 Id. ("where it is demonstrated that a reasonable examiner would merely have
considered particular information to be important but not crucial to his decision not to
reject, a showing of facts which would indicate something more than gross negligence
or recklessness may be required, and good faith judgment or honest mistake might well
be a sufficient defense.").
36 See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see alsoW.
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2014] 99
100 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. X
independently discovered during prosecution. 3 The patent owner
argued that the references were not material because the claims were
allegedly patentable over the prior art all along.38 In affirming the
district court's decision that the withheld references were material, the
Federal Circuit rejected the "objective but for test" offered the patent
owner, stating that "the test for materiality is not whether there is
anticipation or obviousness but, rather, what a 'reasonable examiner
would consider ... important in deciding whether to allow the
application to issue as a patent. ... That the claims may be patentable
over the withheld prior art . .. is not relevant." 39
Two years later, the court decided Western Electric Co., Inc. v.
Piezo Technology, Inc., which involved an issue of whether an examiner
may be compelled to answer questions during a deposition to probe his
technical knowledge of the subject of the patent, to determine whether
he would have recognized the patent owner's allegedly inaccurate or
misleading statements about the prior art.4 0 Below, the district court
ordered the examiner and the Commissioner of the USPTO held in civil
contempt for violating the court's order compelling the examiner to
testify. Reversing, the Federal Circuit rejected the "subjective but for
test" of materiality proposed by the defendant, stating that "[tihe
standard to be applied is not whether a particular examiner would
consider the material to be important, . .. rather it is that of a
'reasonable examiner.' Inquiry into the importance that [an examiner]
may have placed on the representations ... is therefore wholly
irrelevant. ,41
Although the court's decisions in A.B. Dick and Western Electric
contradicted American Hoist's approval of all four materiality
standards, the court's adoption of the USPTO's "reasonable examiner
test" as the sole standard for materiality added consistency to the
requirements patent owners could expect to encounter during patent
prosecution and litigation. Practitioners could rely on the fact they
would likely be held to the same standard when disclosing information
to the USPTO and when facing charges of inequitable conduct in court.
But Federal Circuit panels continued to struggle with consistently
defining the boundaries of the reasonable examiner test, diverging in
several factually similar cases. In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, the panel found non-disclosed information immaterial when
the patent examiner had likely encountered the information when
n A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1393-96.
38 Id. at 1397.
39 Id. at 1397-98 (emphasis in original).
40 W Electric, 860 F.2d at 430.
41 Id. at 433.
Inequitable Conduct and Supplemental Examination
examining another patent application,42 but in JR Stevens& Co. v. Lex
Tex Ltd., the court ruled that to find withheld information immaterial,
the evidence must show that the examiner actually, not just possibly,
knew of the material information.43
The court reached an apparently inconsistent result when
responding to the assertion that uncited information was immaterial
because the examiner had independently discovered the information.
In Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment of no inequitable
conduct in part because the examiner had found the prior art
independently," while in A.B. Dick, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
trial court's inequitable conduct holding despite the examiner having
independently discovered the uncited art.
Besides these inconsistencies in the court's application of the
"reasonable examiner test," since it is the broadest of the four tests for
materiality, its adoption as the sole standard encouraged accused
infringers to raise the defense more frequently by lowering their burden
for proving inequitable conduct. Not coincidentally, by the end of the
1980s, the Federal Circuit had observed "the habit of charging
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague." 4 7 To combat the "plague," the USPTO amended
Rule 56 to recite a more objective standard for materiality. The
resulting "prima facie/inconsistent test," which was promulgated in
1992, recites that information is material when: "(1) It establishes, by
itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a
position the applicant takes [during prosecution]."4 8
The Federal Circuit first discussed the new Rule 56 in Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc. The defendant in Molins had accused the patent owner
of inequitable conduct for having failed to disclose a prior art reference
cited to and by several foreign patent offices during prosecution of
corresponding applications, but which was withheld from the examiner
during prosecution of the U.S. application. 4 9 The Federal Circuit
42 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
43 J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4 Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, 707 F.2d 1376, 1383-84
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
45 A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1396-97.
46 Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363.
47 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
48 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)
(2004).
49 Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1176-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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agreed with the district court that the patent owner's conduct was
inequitable, and indicated that courts should continue to apply the old
Rule 56 standard for materiality (Le., the "reasonable examiner test")
to patents prosecuted before 1992, while reserving the new Rule 56
standard (ie., the "prima facle / inconsistent test") for patents
prosecuted after 1992.50 The Mohns court also affirmed the decisions
in A.B. Dick and Western Electric rejecting the "objective" and
"subjective" but-for tests,5 ' and acknowledged a general rule that non-
cumulative prior art should always be considered per se material.52
In Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., the court
finally faced inequitable conduct in patents prosecuted after 1992. The
defendant in Dayco accused the patent owner of inequitable conduct
for having failed to disclose an Office Action by another examiner
rejecting substantially similar claims.5 3 The Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court that the withheld information was material, but
retreated from the decision in Molins, which would have required the
court to apply the new Rule 56 materiality standard since "the patents-
in-suit were filed and prosecuted after the January 17, 1992, rule
change." 54 Stating that the court "has not decided whether it should
adhere to the preexisting standard for inequitable conduct in
prosecutions occurring after the effective date of the new rule,"55 the
Dayco court applied the old Rule 56 reasonable examiner test
"[b]ecause we conclude that the outcome of this appeal would be the
same under either materiality standard." 56 In addition, the court
created a new per se rule of materiality under which "a contrary
decision of another examiner reviewing a substantially similar claim" is
always material.57
so See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179 ("administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect") (citing the PTO's notice of final rulemaking accompanying the 1992
amendment to Rule 56).
51 See id. at 1179-80 ("the standard to be applied in determining whether a
reference is 'material' is not whether the particular examiner of the application at issue
considered the reference to be important . .. .") (citing W. Electric, 860 F.2d at 433)
and ("that claims may be patentable over the withheld prior art is not the test for
materiality") (citing A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1396).
52 See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180.
53 Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
54 id
s Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1364.
56 Id.
51 Id at 1368.
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Despite the uncertainty in Dayco regarding the proper materiality
standard for patents prosecuted after 1992, the court did adhere to the
decade-old decision in Molins by applying the "prima facie/
inconsistent" standard for materiality in two cases, Bruno Independent
Living v. Acorn Mobility Services, Ltd and Purdue Pharma L.P, v.
Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which involved patents prosecuted after
the new Rule 56 was promulgated. In Bruno, the district court held
that the patent owner had committed inequitable conduct by failing to
disclose to the USPTO several invalidating prior art references he had
disclosed to the Food and Drug Administration in seeking approval to
market the invention covered by the patent at issue.59 In Purdue, the
district court based its inequitable conduct holding on the patent
owner's failure to disclose that the statements made during prosecution
regarding unexpected properties of the claimed invention over the
prior art were based on insight without actual experimental proof.60 In
both cases, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's decision
that the withheld information was material, and applied the new Rule
56 standard for materiality, since the patents were "pending or filed
after March 16, 1992,",61 the effective date of the amendment to Rule
56.
However, seven days after the court decided Purdue, a separate
panel writing in Digital ControlInc. v. Charles Machine Worksreached
back across two decades of precedent to revive the holding in Ameican
Hoist that "[t]here is no reason ... to be bound by any single
[materiality] standard" 62 and, therefore, "if a misstatement or omission
is material under the new Rule 56 standard, it is material. Similarly, if
a misstatement or omission is material under the 'reasonable examiner'
standard or under the older three tests, it is also material." 63 In Digital,
the defendant had accused the patent owner of inequitable conduct for
failing to disclose a prior art reference and for filing a declaration that
contained an affirmative misstatement regarding the date on which the
inventor had reduced his invention to practice.6 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's use of the reasonable examiner test for
materiality, although the patent had been prosecuted after the new
58 See, e.g., Bruno Indep. Living Aids v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348,
1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Purdue Phanna L.P. v. Endo Pharm., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1129
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
59 Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1351.
6 Purdue, 438 F.3d at 1128.
61 Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1352; see also Purdue, 438 F.3d at 1129.
62 Digital, 437 F.3d at 1315.
63 Id at 1316.
* Id. at 1316-17.
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Rule 56 went into effect.65
By holding that the old Rule 56 "reasonable examiner" standard
may apply to patents prosecuted after 1992, the Digitalcourt indicated
once again that defendants face no high burden of proof for establishing
materiality. In the cases following Digital, the court consistently relied
upon the "reasonable examiner test" as the sole standard for
determining materiality. 66 Not surprisingly, therefore, in the year
following Digital, the number of Federal Circuit cases involving
inequitable conduct nearly doubled from 49 cases in 2006 (the year
Digital was decided) to 95 cases in 2007.67 In addition, the percentage
of cases in which the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of the accused
infringer on inequitable conduct increased from 24.5 0/dn 2006 to an
unprecedented 42.10An 2007.68
In view of these trends, former Chief Judge Michel authored an
extended discussion of the elements of inequitable conduct in Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. to encourage the Federal
Circuit and lower courts to "strictly enforce the burden of proof and
elevated standard of proof in the inequitable conduct
context .. . because the penalty for inequitable conduct is so severe." 69
However, although the opinion emphasized that inequitable conduct
requires "at least a threshold level of ... materiality . .. proven by clear
and convincing evidence,"70 the opinion paradoxically set the threshold
65 Id. at 1322.
66 See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions Inc. v. Bridge Med. Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(discussing new Rule 56 but approving the district court's use of the "reasonable
examiner" standard); Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(applying the "reasonable examiner test" but commenting that the information might
even satisfy the objective but for test); Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514
F.3d 1229, 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing new Rule 56 but later stating that
"[t]here is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would have considered
the [withheld information] important in deciding whether to allow the application to
issue."); Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Lab., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Star Scientific v. RJ Reynolds, 537 F.3d 1357,1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008); but see Abbott Lab.
v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (approving the district court's use
of a higher standard of materiality).
67 Decisions for 2005-2009, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics,
http://www.patstats.org/2005-2009_composite.htm (the 49 inequitable conduct cases in
2006 and the 95 inequitable conduct cases in 2007 represent approximately 13.6% and
21.6%, respectively, of the total cases heard by the Federal Circuit in those years).
6 Id. (calculated as the percentage of cases in which the Federal Circuit ruled for
the defendant on the issue of inequitable conduct out of the total number of cases
involving the issue of inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit ruled for the accused
infringer on the issue of inequitable conduct in 31.5% of cases from 2000-2004, in 28.2%
of cases during 2005, in 24.5% of cases during 2006, in 42.1% of cases during 2007, and
in 29.3% of cases during 2008.).
69 Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365.
70 Id. at 1365.
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for materiality low by adopting the reasonable examiner standard as
the sole test for materiality,7 in contradiction with the opinion's stated
purpose of elevating the standard of proof in inequitable conduct cases.
Less than two months later, Judge Newman, who has authored the
vast majority of the post-1988 opinions characterizing inequitable
conduct as a "plague," 72 attempted to remedy Star Scientific's oversight
by approving a high standard for materiality in Abbott Lab. v. Sandoz,
Inc73 The defendant in Abbottaccused the patent owner of inequitable
conduct for allegedly submitting a false declaration to the USPTO and
withholding certain test data inconsistent with the information in the~74patents at issue. The Abbott majority affirmed the district court's
decision that the information was not material under "such a high bar
for materiality that in essence no statement or withholding of
information would be material if it would not change the ultimate
outcome of allowing the patent." Although the district court
characterized its test for materiality as a combination of the new and
old Rule 56 standards, it applied, and the Federal Circuit approved, an
"objective but for test," by asking whether the examiner would have
refused to allow the patent to issue in view of the withheld
information.7 6 Although the decision in Abbott follows the court's
sentiments in Star Scientific that the burden of proof in inequitable
conduct cases should be elevated, it stood in contrast to the actual
decision in Star Scientific reinstating the "reasonable examiner test" as
the only standard for materiality.
Two years after Abbott v. Sandoz, the court again sat en banc in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. to "tighten the standards
for finding [inequitable conduct] in order to redirect a doctrine that has
been overused to the detriment of the public."7 7 The defendant in
Therasense argued that the patent at issue should be found
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct resulting from the patent
n1 See id. at 1367.
72 See, e.g., McKesson, 487 F.3d at 926; Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt.
Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega
Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Ohio Cellular Prods. Corp. v. Adams USA,
Inc., 175 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d
1449, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473,
1482 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Allied Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
7 Abbott, 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
74 Id. at 1343.
7 Id. at 1380 (Gajarsa J. dissenting) (citing the Court's prior rejection of a "but for"
standard of materiality).
76 See id at 1354.
n Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d at 1290.
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owner's failure to disclose information allegedly inconsistent with
representations made to the USPTO. The district court agreed and
held the patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding of inequitable conduct. But on petition for
rehearing en banc, a majority of six judges vacated the panel's decision
and the district court's finding of inequitable conduct, and remanded
the case for further consideration in view of the new standards in the
opinion. Specifically, regarding materiality, the en banc majority
adopted a "but-for" materiality test, defined as follows:
[P]rior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have
allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior
art. ... [E]ven if a district court does not invalidate a claim
based on a deliberately withheld reference, the references
may be material if it would have blocked patent issuance
under the PTO's different evidentiary standards.
Stated differently, if a court concludes that the examiner would
have allowed the claims anyway, then the undisclosed information is
not material.
The opinion also enunciated an "affirmative egregious
misconduct" exception to the "but-for" materiality standard that
should be applied where it would be unjust to allow the patentee to
enforce the patent despite having satisfied the "but-for" test.
Specifically, the majority held that if the patentee has engaged in
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as filing an unmistakably
false affidavit, the misconduct is material. The "affirmative egregious
misconduct" exception incorporates elements of the Supreme Court's
early unclean hands cases that dealt with deliberate plans to defraud
the USPTO and the courts. But beyond the example of filing an
unmistakably false affidavit, the en banc majority left it for future
courts to decide exactly what constitutes "affirmative egregious
misconduct."
We have yet to see whether the "but-for" test for materiality will
survive in the Federal Circuit as the sole standard for materiality. The
last en banc inequitable conduct decision (Kingsdown) did not prove
successful in establishing a particular standard for materiality. The fate
of the Therasense standard largely depends on how the decision is
interpreted, applied, and developed by trial and appellate judges in
7 Id. at 1291-92.
79 Id. at 1292-93.
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cases going forward. No one can know exactly how this will unfold,
especially since inequitable conduct is a fact-based inquiry that must be
decided on a case-by-case basis. And although there was no petition
for certiorari in Therasense, the possibility still exists that the Supreme
Court will weigh in on inequitable conduct. Only time will tell whether
Therasense has changed the standard for materiality.
B. The Standard for Intent
Shortly after the Federal Circuit was founded in October of 1982,
it decided Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn and JR Stevens, which adopted
the Supreme Court's gross negligence standard, set forth in Precision,
as the test for the intent prong of the inequitable conduct analysis.80
Although the court reached different conclusions regarding the
ultimate question of inequitable conduct in each case, it applied the
same "knew or should have known" standard of intent in reaching
those decisions.
The defendant in Kansas Jack had accused the patent owner of
having submitted false statements to the USPTO regarding the
improved safety of the invention compared to prior art devices, and
having failed to disclose that an aspect of the invention ("the Kuhn
post") was known in the prior art.81 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision that the defendant had not established fraud,
since the defendant had "submitted no evidence that [the patent owner]
had any reason . .. to disbelieve his statements to the PTO about
safety" and that merely because "the Kuhn post, years later, was
determined to be prior art, here the closest prior art, does not alone
establish that [the patent owner] should have made a similar evaluation
during prosecution." 82 Instead, the court held that the proper test for
intent in an inequitable conduct analysis is whether "the one charged
with non-disclosure knew or should have known of its materiality at the
time."83
In JR Stevens, the district court had determined that although the
patent applicants knew of and failed to disclose two prior art patents to
the examiner during prosecution, there was no clear and convincing
evidence that the applicants intended to deceive the USPTO by
withholding the references.8 In reversing the district court's decision,
the Federal Circuit stated that unlike common law fraud, "[p]roof of
80 Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1993); IP. Stevens, 747
F.2d at 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
81 See Kansas Jack, 719 F.2d at 1151.
82 Id. at 1151-52.
83 Id. at 1152.
8 See P Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1557.
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deliberate scheming is not needed [to establish inequitable conduct];
gross negligence is sufficient."'8 5 The court further stated "[g]ross
negligence is present when the actor, judged as a reasonable person in
his position, should have known of the materiality of a withheld
reference." 86The court held that a defendant may satisfy the requisite
threshold level of intent "where an actor in applicant's position would
have reasonably known that the reference was material."8 7
The gross negligence/knew or should have known standard for
intent prevailed until 1988, when the Federal Circuit declared "the
habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case
has become an absolute plague."88 To combat the plague, the court
decided Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister Inc., which raised
the defendant's burden for establishing deceptive intent. 89 During
prosecution of the patent at issue in Kingsdown, the examiner had
rejected one of the claims for indefiniteness. 90In response, Kingsdown
submitted an amended version of the claim, which the examiner found
allowable. 9' Kingsdown then filed a continuation application
containing the unamended version of the claim rejected for
indefiniteness.9 Hollister contended that Kingsdown's presentation of
a previously rejected claim in the continuation application constituted
inequitable conduct and rendered the resulting patent unenforceable.
The district court agreed, holding that Kingsdown's conduct satisfied
the gross negligence standard for intent.93 The Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that "Kingsdown's counsel may have been careless, but it was
clearly erroneous to base a finding of intent to deceive on that fact
alone." 94 The court stated en banc that "a finding that particular
conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an
inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of
all the evidence, including evidence of good faith, must indicate
sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive." 95
The higher standard for intent established in Kingsdown persisted
for nearly a decade until a panel of judges, all three of which had
participated in the en banc portion of Kingsdown, decided Critikon,
8 Id. at 1560.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1564.
88 Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422.
89 Kingsdown Med. Consultants v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
90 See id. at 870.
9' See id.
92 See id. at 871.
93 Seeid.
94 Id. at 873.
9 Id. at 876.
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Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc 96 The defendant in
Critikon contended that the asserted patents were unenforceable due
to the patent owner's failure to disclose a prior art patent during
prosecution.97 The district court, applying the intent standard in
Kingsdown, held that the defendant was unlikely to establish that the
patent owner intended to deceive the USPTO by failing to disclose the
withheld reference. The Federal Circuit reversed, and without
mentioning Kingsdown, reestablished a gross negligence/knew or
should have known standard for intent. Reaching back to a pre-
Kingsdown case for support, the Critikon court stated that "intent may
be inferred where a patent applicant knew, or should have known, that
withheld information would be material to the PTO's consideration of
a patent application." 98
In the decade following Critikon, the Federal Circuit ignored the
en banc decision in Kingsdown, and continued to apply a gross
negligence/knew or should have known standard for intent in nearly all
inequitable conduct cases.
To limit the influence of the court's decisions that had loosened
the standard for intent articulated in Kingsdown, then Chief Judge
Michel authored an extended discussion of the elements of inequitable
conduct in Star Scientific, reiterating that "gross negligence [is]
insufficient to prove intent to deceive," oo and instead stating that
"[w]hen the absence of a good faith explanation is the only evidence of
intent ... that evidence alone does not constitute clear and convincing
evidence warranting an inference of intent."o'0 The patents in Star
Scientific related to methods of curing tobacco that resulted in reduced
amounts of carcinogen. 1 02 During prosecution, the applicant learned
of several pieces of potentially invalidating prior art, which were not
disclosed to the USPTO.103 In holding that the district court erred by
96 See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
9 See id. at 1255.
98 Id. at 1256 (citing Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878. 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
99 See, e.g., Brassler U.S.A. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1239
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1352; Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen.
Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417
F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Purdue, 438 F.3d at 1134; But see Dayco 329 F.3d at
1367 ("the district court also erred in concluding that the mere fact that the prosecuting
attorney knew of the Wilson reference and decided not to submit it to the examiner
established intent.").
'o Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
101 Id. at 1368.
10 Id at 1361.
103 Id. at 1362-63.
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concluding that the patent owner intended to deceive the USPTO
during prosecution, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that "because
direct evidence of deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can
be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence." However, the
court stipulated that any inference of intent "must ... be the single
most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence" and
that "[i]f a threshold level of intent to deceive or materiality is not
established by clear and convincing evidence, the district court does not
have any discretion to exercise and cannot hold the patent
unenforceable regardless of the relative equities and how it might
balance them."'4
A month after Star Scientific was decided, one of its panel
members authored Praxair, Inc. v A TMI, Inc., which notably ignored
Star Scientific in its intent analysis. 05 The defendant in Praxair alleged
that the asserted patents were unenforceable because the patent owner
had withheld three items of prior art from the examiner during
prosecution.106 In affirming the district court's conclusion that "the
level of materiality of [one of the pieces of prior art] is sufficiently high
so as to support an ultimate finding of inequitable conduct," the Federal
Circuit effectively ignored the holding in Star Scientific that gross
negligence is insufficient to prove intent to deceive, instead ruling that
"[a]n inference of intent to deceive is generally appropriate ... when
(1) highly material information is withheld; (2) 'the applicant knew of
the information [and] ... knew or should have known of the materiality
of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible
explanation for the withholding."'
Despite the Praxair court's initial indication that its efforts in Star
Scientific to raise the standard for intent back to its Kingsdown level
would be largely ignored, subsequent cases heeded the call for reform
and refused to infer intent from gross negligence. 08 However, since
two were by judges who have written the fewest number of majority
opinions finding inequitable conduct,'" it was uncertain whether the
104 Id at 1366-67 (emphasis added).
105 Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
106 Id at 1310-14.
107 Id. at 1313-14 (quoting FerringB. V v. BarrLabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); alterations in original)).
108 See, e.g., Abbott, 544 F.3d at 1353; Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prod. Ltd., 559
F.3d 1317, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009); and Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d
1366, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, rh'ng granted 595 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
109 See Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague ": Reforming the Doctine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 1329 (2009) (None of Judge Newman's
majority opinions and only 9% of Judge Linn's involve findings of inequitable
conduct.).
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rest of their colleagues would follow suit and finally move away from
the gross negligence/knew or should have known standard for intent.
Two years later, however, the court again sat en banc in
Therasense. One of the goals of the en banc majority in Therasense
was to "tighten[] the standards for finding both intent and materiality
in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment
of the public.""o Specifically, regarding intent, the en banc majority
eradicated the "should have known" standard articulated in its previous
cases, instead requiring a showing that "the patentee acted with the
specific intent to deceive the PTO." "' "A finding that a
misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross negligence or
negligence under a 'should have known standard' does not satisfy this
intent requirement."ll 2 Instead, for there to have been intent to deceive
the PTO, "the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it."" 3
In addition, the en banc majority adopted Star Scientific's "single
most reasonable inference" standard for proving the intent prong of
inequitable conduct, holding that if multiple reasonable inferences can
be drawn from the evidence, intent to deceive cannot be found.114 The
majority further held that "[t]he absence of a good faith explanation for
withholding a material reference does not, by itself, prove intent to
deceive.""'5 In addition, unless "the accused infringer first . .. prove[s]
a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence,"
the patentee need not offer any good faith explanation at all. 116 These
standards articulated by the en banc majority set a high burden for
satisfying the intent prong.
Again, only time will tell whether the Therasense decision will
have a lasting impact on the law of inequitable conduct. The Federal
Circuit has taken inconsistent approaches to the standard for intent,
and there is no guarantee that the court will adhere to Therasense's new
stricter standard. In addition, the Therasense court left several
questions unanswered, including what constitutes "a threshold level of
intent." Since inequitable conduct is not an exact science, and each case
presents its own unique set of facts, we must wait and see whether the
Therasense standard for intent takes root in future cases.




114 Id. at 1290-91.
115 Id. at 1291.
116 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Star, 537 F.3d at 1368).
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III. NAVIGATING THE QUAGMIRE
Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit has tried to
uniformly apply to the defense of inequitable conduct. The court has
consistently stated (although not consistently applied) the following
elements: (1) a requirement for threshold showings of materiality and
intent; followed by (2) a weighing of the evidence to determine if a
holding of patent unenforceability is appropriate. The court has also
consistently held that the defendant carries the ultimate burden of
proving inequitable conduct and that, if successful, the effect on an
issued patent is unenforceability. However, the Federal Circuit's
contrary decisions regarding the proper tests for materiality and intent
have left the standards in disarray and have led to more confusion than
clarity.
In addition, the USPTO has failed to provide guidance that would
allow patent applicants to know which materiality standard will apply
at the patent prosecution stage. The USPTO's Rule 56 prohibits
inequitable conduct by imposing a duty of candor and good faith on
every individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application. The current version of Rule 56 provides that information
is material if it is not cumulative and (1) "establishes, by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facle case of
unpatentability of a claim," or it (2) "refutes, or is inconsistent with"
positions taken by the applicant during prosecution. 117 This "prima
facie/inconsistent" test has remained the USPTO's standard for
materiality since 1992, despite the Federal Circuit's shifting positions.
Two months after Therasense, however, the USPTO issued
proposed changes to Rule 56 in light of the Federal Circuit's en banc
decision. 118 The proposed changes cite Therasense and adopt the
standard of materiality set forth by the majority. Specifically, under the
proposed new Rule 56, information is material to patentability if: (1)
"[t]he Office would not allow a claim if it were aware of the
information, applying the preponderance of the evidence standard and
giving the claim its broadest reasonable construction," or (2) "the
applicant engages in affirmative egregious misconduct before the
Office as to the information." 19
However, the USPTO's proposed changes to Rule 56 have yet to
be implemented, and the "prima facie/inconsistent" standard from the
117 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
118 Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631 (proposed Jul. 21, 2011) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
"9 Id. at 43,633.
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1992 version of Rule 56 remains the USPTO's current standard.
Practitioners thus face two conflicting standards for materiality: a
"prna facie/inconsistent" standard that applies during prosecution,
and a "but-for" test that applies during litigation. This creates
confusion for patent practitioners when they prosecute patents and
when they consider how their conduct and disclosures may affect future
litigation, and makes it difficult for applicants to predict which steps to
take during prosecution to lessen their vulnerability to inequitable
conduct allegations.
Unless the legislature steps in, it may be time to recognize that,
unlike in other areas of patent law, the facts that present themselves in
inequitable conduct cases are so diverse and so dependent on the
reactions of the triers of fact to the witnesses and documents at trial,
that true uniformity is not possible from the courts.
IV. ENTER CONGRESS
A. The America Invents Act
Championed by Senator Orrin Hatch,120 the America Invents Act
(AIA) authorized a new post-grant proceeding, "supplemental
examination," allowing patent owners to submit to the USPTO any
information "relevant to the patent" to possibly provoke an exparte
examination. 121 One of the most groundbreaking changes the AIA
added to U.S. patent law, the supplemental examination process of
section 257 changed the way inequitable conduct cases are handled.
According to a leading authority on the legislative history of the
AIA, "the concept grew out of Senator Hatch's advocacy over several
of Congresses' proposals to restrict the inequitable-conduct
doctrine." 22 The first Senate version of the AIA included a provision
that sharply limited the courts' authority to hold a patent unenforceable
for inequitable conduct, but the provision was dropped in 2007.123 But
Senator Hatch continued to advocate for reform, stating inequitable
conduct "has been overpleaded and has become a drag on the litigation
process."l24
After finally settling on the supplemental examination provision,
120 157 CONG. REC. S1097 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see
also Joseph Matal, Legislative History of the America In vents Act: Part I of I, 21 FED.
CIR. B.J. 545 (2011).
121 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 28 (2011).
122 Matal, supra note 120. at 545.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 546 (citing 153 CONG. REc. S4691 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of
Sen. Hatch)).
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Senator Hatch stated "the supplemental examination provision satisfies
a long-felt need in the patent community to be able to identify whether
a patent would be deemed flawed if it ever went to litigation and
enables patentees to take corrective action. This process enhances the
quality of patents, thereby promoting greater certainty for patentees
and the public." 1 25 Senator Kyl noted, "in evaluating whether a fraud is
'material' for purpose of referral, the Director should look to the
Federal Circuit's decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
,o.126
B. Supplemental Examination
The new supplemental examination procedure allows a patent
owner to file a petition requesting that the USPTO consider,
reconsider, or correct information in a patent or its file history. 127
Within three months, the USPTO will determine whether the
information in the request raises a substantial new question of
patentability. 2 8 If so, it will order exparte reexamination in view of the
submitted evidence, during which the patent owner can argue for
patentability of the claimed invention.129
Importantly, the AIA bars as the basis for a finding of inequitable
conduct anything considered in the request for supplemental
examination or during the ensuing ex parte reexamination.
Specifically, "[a] patent shall not be held unenforceable . . . if the
information was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a
supplemental examination . . . .,,130 Any omission or misrepresentation
that was not previously considered, was inadequate, or was incorrect
can be submitted to the USPTO and expunged after a patent has issued.
This is a powerful tool for purging inequitable conduct post facto.
Still, there are important limitations to what supplemental
examination can accomplish. For instance, supplemental examination
becomes unavailable once an accused infringer has raised an
inequitable conduct defense. 131 In addition, the cleansing effect of a
supplemental examination occurs only once the proceeding and any ex
125 Id. at 547 (citing CONG. REC. S1097) (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
126 Id. at 549 (citing 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Kyl.)).
127 37 C.F.R. § 1.605 (2014) "[a]n item of information includes a document submitted
as part of the request that contains information, believed to be relevant to the patent,
that the patent owner requests the Office to consider, reconsider, or correct.")
128 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2012).
129 § 257 (b).
130 § 257(c).
131 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A).
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parte reexamination ordered therefrom has drawn to a close,13 2 which
could take years. So if the patent becomes involved in litigation before
the USPTO completes its review, the accused infringer may raise an
inequitable conduct defense regarding any information that the patent
owner asked the USPTO to consider in its request for supplemental
examination.
A "fraud" exception also limits supplemental examination. If the
Director learns that a material fraud had been committed on the
USPTO during patent prosecution, the matter will be referred to the
Attorney General for disciplinary proceedings against the patent
attorney. The patent owner may also face criminal and antitrust claims
under § 257(f).
The USPTO also places high burdens on patent owners seeking
supplemental examination. First, it has set a steep fee for the
procedure. 13 3 Second, it requires patent owners to make, on the record,
fairly substantial admissions regarding errors made during
prosecution.134 For errors involving omitted references, parties must
admit the document is "relevant to the patent" and must explain its
relevance; however, they specifically do not have to address the item's
"materiality."l 35 Third, it limits the number of items that a patent
132 § 257(c)(2)(B).
133 See Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and To Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg.
48828 (Aug. 14, 2012) ("This final rule requires the following supplemental
examination fees:
(1) A fee of $5,140.00 for processing and treating a request for supplemental
examination;
(2) a fee of $16,120.00 for an ex parte reexamination ordered as a result of a
supplemental examination proceeding; and
(3) for processing and treating, in a supplemental examination proceeding, a non-
patent document over 20 pages in length, a fee of $170.00 for a document of between
21 and 50 pages, and a fee of $280.00 for each additional 50 pages or a fraction thereof.
This final rule also requires the following reexamination fees:
(1) $17,750.00 for filing a request for ex parte reexamination;
(2) $1,930.00 for filing a petition in an ex parte or inter partes reexamination
proceeding, except for those specifically enumerated in 37 CFR 1.550(i) and 1.937(d);
and
(3) $4,320.00 for a denied request for ex parte reexamination under 37 CFR 1.510 (this
amount is included in the request for ex parte reexamination fee, and is the portion not
refunded if the request for reexamination is denied).").
134 37 C.F.R. § 1.605 (2014) ("(b) An item of information includes a document
submitted as part of the request that contains information, believed to be relevant to
the patent, that the patent owner requests the Office to consider, reconsider, or
correct.").
135 77 Fed. Reg. at 48845 ("The Office must determine whether any of the items of
information raises a substantial new question of patentability, not whether any of the
items of information is 'material.' Therefore, the Office is not adopting a requirement
that the patent owner state whether or why an item of information is or is not
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owner may raise in a request for supplemental examination.' 36 Fourth,
the USPTO's decision regarding whether the patent owner has
presented a substantial new question of patentability is rendered
without the right to an interview regarding the merits of the request,
and without the right to make any amendments to the patent.
However, interviews and amendments are permitted if the USPTO
grants the request and initiates exparte reexamination.
C Statistics and Recommendations
In view of these limitations, not surprisingly, supplemental
examination has lagged behind the other new post-grant proceedings
created by the America Invents Act. In the first two years after their
availability, the USPTO received over 2,000 inter partes review and
covered business method post-grant review petitions. During that same
period, there were only 81 requests for Supplemental Examination.
material.").
11 37 C.F.R. § 1.605 (a) (limiting items of information to twelve items). (2014)
("Items of information") (limiting parties to twelve "items").
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Of those 81 requests for Supplemental Examination, 57 have
publicly available file histories. A review of those file histories reveals
that they are fairly evenly dispersed across the technologies:
Electrical I 30% (17/57)
Design 3% (2/57)





Figure 3: Breakdown of Technologies in Early Supplemental Examinations
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In addition, the USPTO is finding a substantial new question of
patentability in the vast majority (74%) of cases:
M No SNQ Found
SNQ Found
Figure 4: Outcomes of USPTO determinations regarding substantial new question of
patentability
Before filing a request for supplemental examination,
practitioners may want to visit http://www.uspto.gov/blog/aia/entry/
from janet gongola patent-reform, which was created in December of
2012 by the USPTO and contains Tips for Filing a Complaint
Supplemental Examination Request. In addition, patent owners ought
to carefully consider the timing of any effort at supplemental
examination if they might soon seek to enforce the patent. While a
decision on the request for supplemental examination may be made in
three months, the patent could be tied up in the Patent Office for over
a year if the Director orders exparte reexamination. And appealing an
adverse decision in the exparte reexamination could delay any effort
to enforce a patent for at least another year.
We suggest assessing the enforceability of valuable patent
portfolios early to determine if requesting supplemental examination is
a strategy. In the pharmaceutical industry, patent holders might want
to make such an analysis when listing a patent in the FDA's Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations ("Orange
Book"). Patent owners can be fairly certain that an Orange Book-listed
patent will be litigated, but usually not for at least several years,
providing good odds that a supplemental examination (and any
subsequent ex parte reexamination) would run its course before the
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patent owner seeks to enforce the patent against accused infringers.
Patent owners in litigation may request and be granted a stay
pending the outcome of the supplemental examination and subsequent
reexamination. If they are granted a stay, the patent is preserved, valid,
and can be used against other licensees and infringers. The inequitable
conduct allegation survives regarding the then-current litigants, 35
U.S.C. §257(c)(2)(B), but the patent could emerge from the proceeding
free from future inequitable conduct charges.137 Thus, despite its slow
acceptance by patent owners, supplemental examination is likely to be
viewed by at least some as an appealing "safety net" for rectifying
possible deficiencies in the duty of disclosure during initial prosecution.
Interestingly, the AIA also may have unintentionally provided
other options for curing inequitable conduct. For instance, in amending
the reissue sections of the statute, Congress removed the requirement
that any errors corrected through reissue were made without deceptive
intent. 138 The Federal Circuit has noted that inequitable conduct
cannot be cured through reissue. But if the USPTO considers an item
of information during a reissue proceeding and still reissues the patent,
an accused infringer would be hard-pressed to argue that the item of
information was "but for" material under the Therasense test for
inequitable conduct. 139 Congress' removal of the "without deceptive
intention" requirement from the reissue statute, in combination with
the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Therasense requiring but-for
materiality to establish inequitable conduct, arguably opens the door
for patent owners to address questions of materiality via reissue.1 40
V. CONCLUSION
Most inventions require significant expenditures of time and
money, and are burdened with high risk. Investors are unlikely to
contribute to the research and development of new inventions unless
they believe they will receive a return on their investment. Patents
provide this assurance. However, the defense of inequitable conduct,
with its inconsistent standards of materiality and intent established by
137 See Englishtown, Inc. v. Rosetta Stone Inc., 962 F. Supp.2d 355, 361 (D. Mass.
2013) (the office granted ex parte reexam, and the court stayed the inequitable conduct
claims; thus, the inequitable conduct claim survives stay, but at least the patent survives
as to the world).
138 See 35 U.S.C. § 251.
139 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.2011)
(en banc).
140 It's important to bear in mind, however, that there is no way to address the
deceptive intent prong of the inequitable conduct analysis through reissue.
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the Federal Circuit, can, depending on all facts and circumstances, cast
serious doubts over the value of issued patents.
To ensure that patents remain a reliable support for commercial
investment in new innovations, and given the long history of a lack of
judicial uniformity in inequitable conduct, true reform probably will
not come from the courts or the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. If we
are ever to reach a consistent standard for inequitable conduct, it may
have to come from Congress in future patent reform.
Supplemental Examination may help cure certain instances of
inequitable conduct, but in practice seems little used. We predict,
however, that patent owners will continue to use supplemental
examinations to strengthen valuable patents against future attacks of
inequitable conduct.
